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I. The role of the European Central Bank in the Treaty on European Union and its
relation to the European Parliament
As from 1 January 1999, when European Monetary Union was launched, the European Central
Bank (ECB) has conducted a single monetary policy on behalf of all the countries participating
in Monetary Union. The ECB is the first European federal authority and was established with
unprecedented powers. Articles 105 et seq of the Treaty on European Union
1 state its
institutional, functional, objective and staffing independence. Articles 2
2 and 7
3 of the Statute of
the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank stress the importance
of this independence further. Article 108
4 states very clearly that in the exercise of their powers
and carrying out of their tasks and duties, neither the ECB nor a national central bank, nor any
member of their decision-making bodies should seek or take instructions from Community
institutions or bodies, any national government or any other body. Unlike any other central
bank, the ECB is assigned the priority objective of price stability, which was left to the ECB to
define. The independence of the ECB is very far reaching as it is established by the Treaty on
European Union, an international treaty which can only be altered by means of a unanimous
decision of the member states and ratification by national parliaments.
The unprecedentedly high degree of the ECB’s independence calls for a correspondingly high
level of democratic accountability, as real independence requires legitimacy and transparency in
order to be credible and lastingly accepted. The purpose of central bank independence is to
favour the long term over the short term in its monetary policy decisions. In order to carry out
its task of maintaining price stability, the ECB has at its disposal a number of monetary
instruments, in particular the power to determine short-term interest rates. These influence real
                                               
1 Treaty on European Union, revised by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Chapter 2: Monetary Policy
2 Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, Article 2, Objectives: «In accordance with Article 105 (1) of
this Treaty, the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the
objective of price stability, it shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2 of this Treaty. (…) »
3 Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, Article 7, Independence : « In accordance with Article 108 of
this Treaty, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by this Treaty
and this Statute, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall
seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from
any other body. The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States undertake to
respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the
national central banks in the performance of their tasks. »
4 Treaty on European Union, revised version, Article 108 : « When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks
and duties conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central
bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions
or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. The Community institutions and bodies
and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the
members of decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in performance of their tasks. »3
economic aggregates such as economic growth, investment and employment. In addition,
Article 105 (1) lays down that the primary objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability.
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, however, “the ESCB shall support the
general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of
the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2
5.” In this framework, there is the risk
that, in order to demonstrate independence, a central bank seeks to enhance its own reputation
by breaking records for price stability, hence steering towards deflation. Thus, the ECB is very
rightly accountable to the European public, and, as the sole democratically-legitimised
institution, it is the European Parliament which has to hold the ECB to account. Accordingly,
this necessity has been laid down as a Treaty obligation.
In sum, reconciling Central Bank independence with the requirements of democracy means that
we need transparency in and justification of monetary decision making. The European Union
needs it because democracy and transparency belong together. Competence was shifted to the
EU level as national Central Banks transferred their decision-making powers to the ECB. The
ECB needs transparency in order to get credibility in monetary decisions, and the confidence
which is needed for EMU.  It is for this reason that the European Parliament has been paying
special attention to the explanations for monetary decisions and actions as well as their
background.
Article 113 (3) of the Treaty and Articles 15.1 and 15.3 of the ESCB Statute lay down the
principle of transparency and the relation of the ECB to the European Parliament. Article 113
(3) and Article 15.3
6 of the Statute require that the President of the ECB presents an annual
report on the activities of the ESCB and on monetary policy to the European Parliament. In
addition, the President and the other members of the Executive Board can be asked by the
European Parliament to give evidence to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.
7
Article 15.1
8 of the Statute adds the requirement to publish reports at least on a quarterly basis.
                                               
5 Treaty on European Union, revised version, Article 2 : « The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a
common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred
to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development
of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women,
sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic
performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the
standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. »
6 Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, Article 15.3 : « In Accordance with Article 113 (3) of this
Treaty, the ECB shall address an annual report on the activities of the ESCB and on the monetary policy of both the
previous and the current year to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and also to the
European Council. »
7 Treaty on European Union, revised version, Article 113 (3) : « The ECB shall address an annual report on the
activities of the ESCB and on the monetary policy of both the previous and current year to the European4
Until the 1999-2004 legislature, the monetary dialogue between the European Parliament and
the ECB took place within the Parliament’s Subcommittee on Monetary Affairs. It is now the
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs which is the relevant committee for this
dialogue. The Subcommittee on Monetary Affairs was set up on 9 April 1992. Its activities
reflected the European Parliament's new role in monetary affairs and they were geared towards
building up a tradition by which the European Parliament, consisting as it does of
representatives of the people of the European Union, becomes widely accepted as the
appropriate institution in charge of the democratic accountability of the ECB. With the prospect
of economic and monetary union, the European Parliament needed a forum in which all
financial and monetary issues could be discussed with the necessary expertise. The aim was to
organise a monetary dialogue with all actors already in the early phases of EMU, especially with
the national central banks and the European Monetary Institute but also with other institutions
and actors affected by monetary union, so that the views of financial and economic agents,
consumers and citizens could be duly taken into account.
Particular attention was paid to regular meetings with the President of the Committee of
Governors of the Central Banks and the national central banks who were responsible for
monetary decisions until January 1999. In this dialogue, monetary policy questions, the
convergence process and the contribution of monetary policies to solving the problem of
unemployment were regularly discussed. Although employment has not been a formal criterion
for the introduction of the single currency, the European Parliament strongly believed that it
must be taken into account for the overall assessment of economic trends in the member
countries. It still regards it as the greatest challenge facing Europe.
The European Parliament has also attached great importance to hearing the relevant central bank
governors from outside the European Union: before the accession of Austria, Sweden and
Finland with the EFTA countries, and now with the central bank governors of the Central and
Eastern European Countries.
Throughout the years preceding the creation of EMU particular consideration was given to the
annual examination of the nominal convergence processes of the member states. The Parliament
                                                                                                                                                     
Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and also to the European Council. The President of the ECB shall
present this report to the Council and to the European Parliament, which may hold a general debate on that basis.
The President of the ECB and the other members of the Executive and other members of the Executive Board may,
at the request of the European Parliament or on their own initiative, be heard by the competent Committees of the
European Parliament. »
8 Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, Article 15.1, Reporting commitments : « The ECB shall draw
up and publish reports on the activities of the ESCB at least quarterly. »5
was fully integrated in the preparations for the historical decision about the start of Monetary
Union. In a solemn plenary session on May 2, 1998, the European Parliament voted in favour of
the start of EMU with 11 member states which had fulfilled the five convergence criteria. The
European Parliament found that considerable progress had been made by the member states of
the European Union in terms of convergence with a view to the start of the third stage of
Economic and Monetary Union, which led to low inflation rates, low long-term interest rates,
limited exchange rate fluctuations and sufficient consolidation of government budgets both in
terms of deficit and debt levels. It judged that the introduction of the single currency was
feasible by the 11 member states and that the degree of independence of the national central
banks was in line with the Treaty.
A crucial topic for the monetary discussions at the European Parliament were the effects of
monetary policy on investment, growth and employment. This took place in the framework of
dialogues with national central banks and ministries of finance. The Subcommittee also began
monitoring trends in monetary policies in the member states. The need for transparency was
stressed. The European Parliament has repeatedly observed that the central banks had come to
terms very thoroughly with the economic, employment, social and financial policy situations
and decisions of the individual member states and that regular dialogue existed between the
national central banks and national governments. Interestingly enough, neither the Danish nor
the Dutch central bank governors could be heard at the European Parliament. Their
independence was such that they did not even appear before their own national parliaments.
From the beginning of Stage Two, the principle of accountability that now applies to the ECB
was applied to the European Monetary Institute. Under the Treaty, the EMI had a duty of co-
operation with the European Parliament, which it fulfilled in plenary sessions and in the
dialogue with the Subcommittee on Monetary Affairs in order to prepare for the establishment
of the ECB and the beginning of EMU. The EMI reports on its activities and on economic and
monetary convergence formed the basis of hearings in the Subcommittee, which also considered
other topical issues and the secondary legislation on the preparations for EMU. Once a year, the
President of the EMI presented his institution’s annual report at the plenary session of the
European Parliament as the ECB President does now.
II.  Monetary Policy of the ECB as seen by the European Parliament
The primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability. By leaving it to the ECB to
define price stability, the Treaty also gives it influence over economic policy. It is the ECB6
which decides whether to make central bank funds available and at what interest rates, and this
in turn has implications for economic growth, investment and employment. As the Treaty does
not give a precise definition of price stability, or establish by whom this concept is to be defined
or by whom this definition is to be set, it is therefore clear that these tasks fell to the ECB
according to Article 12
9 of its Statute. It can be discussed whether the definition of price
stability should have been determined by a political process, but given that it is the ECB’s
prerogative, the degree of its independence is shown very clearly. This fact, on the other hand,
increases also the need for democratic accountability. As central banks have become
increasingly independent, the trend toward legitimisation by means of the transparency of
monetary decisions through monetary dialogue with parliaments has developed everywhere.
The ECB’s monetary strategy consist of three main elements: a quantitative definition of price
stability and a two-pillar strategy used to achieve this objective: a broadly based assessment of
the outlook for price developments and a quantitative reference value for the annual growth rate
of M3. The ECB defined price stability as a rate of year-on-year change in the consumer price
level of below 2%
10. The monetary reference value is defined as a 4.5% growth in the money
supply.
11 The mix of inflationary and monetary reference values, however, leads more to
confusion than to clarification. Consequently, the precise definition of price stability, how it is
to be monitored as well as the precise role of the M3 reference value in determining monetary
policy have given rise to much discussion well beyond the Parliament.
The ECB assigns a prominent role to money supply, but at the same time, they claim that the
euro area monetary aggregate does not need to be controllable in the short run. Obviously, there
are reasons for this lack of controllability. First, the demand for money is not stable in the short
                                               
9 Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, Article 12.1, Responsibility of decision-making bodies : « The
Governing Council shall adopt the guidelines and make the decisions necessary to ensure the performance of the
tasks entrusted to the ESCB under this Treaty and this Statute. The Governing Council shall formulate the monetary
policy of the Community including, as appropriate, decisions relating to intermediate monetary objectives, key
interest rates and the supply of reserves in the ESCB, and shall establish the necessary guidelines for their
implementation. The Executive Board shall implement monetary policy in accordance with the guidelines and
decisions laid down by the Governing Council. In doing so the Executive Board shall give the necessary
instructions to national banks. In addition the Executive Board may have certain powers delegated to it where the
Governing Council so decides.  (…) »
10 Press Release of the meeting of the Governing Council on October 13, 1998 : « Price stability shall be defined as
a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2% . Price
stability is to be maintained over the medium term. (…) The precise definition of the reference aggregate and the
specific value for monetary growth will be announced by the Governing Council of the ECB in December 1998.»
11 Press Release of the meeting of the Governing Council on December 1, 1998 : « The reference value will refer to
the broad monetary aggregate M3. M3 will consist of currency in circulation plus certain liabilities of Monetary
Financial Institutions (MFIs) resident in the euro area and, in the case of deposits, the liabilities of some institutions
that are part of central government (such as Post Offices and Treasuries). (…) the Governing Council decided to set
the first reference value at 4 ½%.  In December 1999, the Governing Council of the ECB will review the reference
value for monetary growth.»7
run. This problem increases with low inflation rates as they reduce the opportunity cost of
holding money. What is more, doubts have been raised about whether M3 can even be an
indication of inflationary development in the longer run, as the new euro zone is expected to
give rise to erratic movements in this aggregate at least over a seven-year transition period.
Secondly, the demand for M3 depends on interest rate variables that cannot be directly
controlled by the ECB. But if the operating targets of the ECB lack a systematic influence on the
growth rates of M3, then the whole approach becomes questionable. The ECB is aware of this
control problem. In reality, by focussing on inflation rates rather than M3, the ECB appears
rather to be pursuing a one-pillar strategy. Thus it avoids using the term “intermediate target”
and speaks of a “reference value” instead. The question is, however, what the function of such a
reference value is, compared with the role of an intermediate target. The German example of the
Bundesbank pursuing a monetary target shows that the control problem exists not only in the
short run but also in the medium and long run. Even over long periods, the Bundesbank was
often unable, or unwilling, to meet the target. This, in turn, questions the predictability of
monetary decisions. Market actors have to be able to rely on the ECB, and they have to be able
to anticipate their decisions to some extent. The current overshooting of M3 over the reference
value makes the ECB’s future behaviour uncertain. And uncertainty about the basis of future
judgement  gives rise to market speculation. Concentrating on specific inflation targets, together
with inflation forecasts, evaluations of inflation trends, and intermediate money-supply targets,
as well as the underlying forecasts for GDP growth, would be better. This would lead to more
transparency in the ECB’s monetary strategy and would make it easier to hold it to account.
Another area of concern is the definition of price stability by the ECB as such. In the
Parliament’s view, the ECB did not choose this definition carefully enough, in particular its
narrowness. Not only inflationary risks have to be taken into account: deflation is detrimental to
the economy as well. In addition, if the band is too narrow, problems with statistical data come
to the fore. A hearing in the Monetary Subcommittee on statistical data on February 17, 1999
revealed that in terms of form, quality and timeliness the statistical data for the euro zone leave
much to be desired. Euro-11-data rely on national data produced by the national central banks.
Their quality, however, is the key for monetary strategies and reliability. Another complicating
factor has been that research by Fed economists have shown that inflation rates might
misinterpret the true rate of price increases. Official data for inflation are assumed to be
overstated by around 1% on an annual basis. As mentioned above, the problem of inaccurate
statistical measurement of price changes might be even more pronounced in the EU. Thus, the8
risk of undershooting the lower bound of the target zone without noticing immediately is real.
Therefore, the European Parliament underlines that it is crucial for the ECB to have more room
for manoeuvre by re-defining the range.
III. The role of the ECB in Economic and Monetary Union
In addition to maintaining price stability, the ECB has other duties to perform. Article 105 of the
Treaty recognises the capacity of monetary policy to contribute to the achievement of the
objectives of the Community of Articles 2 and 3 concerning economic growth and a high level
of employment. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ECB has to take into
account the need to support the economic policies of the European Union, which are to lead to
economic and social cohesion. With a single monetary policy, Europe must gain a more
appropriate and better balanced policy mix, which is badly needed to stimulate investment,
growth and employment. Thus, the European Parliament welcomed the first rate move of the
ECB when it cut its key refinancing rate by 50 basis points on April 8, 1999, as this showed that
the ECB was concerned about the deteriorating economic prospects of the euro area. Already
the coordinated interest rate cut of the European central banks in December 1998 indicated the
right direction.
Clearly, monetary policy must be supported in its task of ensuring price stability by
commensurate budget measures, wage developments and efficient product and capital markets.
In addition to this, however, an intensive European dialogue between economic actors and
social partners in the framework of the Community institutions and Community consultation
procedures is essential in order better to define and achieve the Community's economic, social
and environmental objectives. The overall economic performance of the EU in the last decade
was disappointing. The EP is therefore calling for a profound analysis and for the installation of
the appropriate, co-ordinated instruments to tackle the underlying problems that resulted in the
stagnation of the nineties.  In the perception of the Parliament, the achievement of qualitative
progress in bringing down unemployment figures requires more than just structural reform:
what is needed is sustained high growth of at least 3%.  Current discussions focus on whether
the EU should set itself quantitative targets for growth and employment as it has for inflation
and budgetary deficits, but so far no consensus has emerged in the matter.
The European Parliament stresses the importance of an appropriate and balanced policy mix that
fosters stability and sustainable growth. This implies, on the one hand, sound macroeconomic9
policies conducive to sustained non-inflationary growth and employment, and, on the other
hand, greater co-ordination of economic and structural policies to maximise the growth and
employment potential of the EU. At its meeting in Cologne on June 3 and 4, 1999, the European
Council decided on a European Employment Pact aimed at a sustainable reduction of
unemployment, based on three main pillars, one of which is the so-called Cologne process: a
macro-economic dialogue aimed at improving interaction between wage developments and
monetary, budgetary and fiscal policy.
12 The ECB has to contribute to the macro-economic
dialogue.
The procedures by which these general policies come into existence are still in the process of
development although, enshrined already in the Treaty on European Union, they should have
been put into practice since Stage Two of EMU. Key elements are the Annual Economic Report
and the broad economic guidelines by the Commission, on which Parliament holds an annual
debate and produces political proposals and recommendations for the Council of Ministers and
the Commission. The European Parliament insists on participating officially on these procedures
beyond what is already provided in Articles 128
13  and 130
14 and in current practice. To act
against the democratic deficit in these procedures, the European Parliament calls for an inter-
institutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council,
including the procedure of the broad economic guidelines and the excessive deficit procedure. In
the meantime, the European Parliament calls for the ECB’s own Annual Reports to contain
judgements of the extent to which monetary policy has in fact supported the general economic
policies. Once a year, an ECB position on the economic situation in the euro-11 zone is asked
for on the occasion of the presentation of the Annual Economic Report.
                                               
12 The second pillar is a further development and better implementation of the co-ordinated employment strategy
(Luxembourg process), the third pillar consists in a comprehensive structural reform and modernisation to improve
the innovative capacity and efficiency of goods, services and capital markets (Cardiff process).
13 Treaty on European Union, revised version, Article 128: « (1) The European Council shall each year consider the
employment situation in the Community and adopt conclusions thereon, on the basis of a joint annual report by the
Council and the Commission. (2) On the basis of the conclusions of the European Council, the Council, (…) after
consulting the European Parliament, (…) shall each year draw up guidelines which the Member States shall take
into account in their employment policies. (…) »
14 Treaty on European Union, revised version, Article 130 : « The Council, after consulting the European
Parliament, shall establish an Employment Committee with advisory status to promote co-ordination between
Member States on employment and labour market policies. (…)»  10
IV.  Monetary dialogue – first experiences
1. The nomination procedure and the European Parliament
The European Parliament had to be consulted on the appointment of the six members of the
Executive Board by the governments of the member states (Article 112(2)b
15). This was also the
case for the nominations of the Presidents of the EMI in Stage Two. These hearings - held in
public along the lines of those in the US Senate - allowed for a judgement to be formed of the
candidates' personal integrity, professional competence and views on monetary and economic
policy. Unlike in the United States, however, the nomination process does not comprise a
confirmation procedure. The European Parliament has no power to enforce its decision or
legally to prevent a nomination. This means that the European Parliament has only a political
power to assess nominees, and, through its hearing procedure, helps to guide public opinion. In
view of the importance of their position and their impact on economic, financial, employment
and social policy, the requirements applicable to members of the Executive Board must be very
stringent. A candidate who fails to convince the European Parliament should not be acceptable.
Therefore, the current procedure for appointing members of the ECB’s Executive Board is
important but can only be a first step. The ECB gains in credibility and legitimacy if members of
the Executive Board give a convincing performance in public.
2.  Reporting and publishing: the ECB’s annual report and monthly bulletins
The principle of transparency is described in the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB and the
ECB. Article 113(3) of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 5
16 and 15 of the Statute
require ECB reports to be published. The reports in question are annual reports, which facilitate
the dialogue with the European Parliament on the monetary policy pursued in the past and
current years and the ECB’s plans for the future, as well as reports on the activities of the ESCB
which should be drawn up and published at least quarterly. This publication requirement makes
the ECB democratically accountable. A reading of Article 15 in conjunction with Article 12
                                               
15 Treaty on European Union, revised version, Article 112(2)b : « The President, the Vice-President and the other
members of the Executive Board shall be appointed from among persons of recognised standing and professional
experience in monetary or banking matters by common accord of the governments of the Member States at the
level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation from the Council, after it has consulted the European
Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB. Their term of office shall be eight years and shall not be
renewable. Only nationals of Member States may be members of the Executive Board. »  
16 Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB, Article 5.1,  Collection of statistical information: « In order to
undertake the tasks of the ESCB, the ECB, assisted by the national central banks, shall collect the necessary
statistical information either from the competent national authorities or directly from economic agents. (…) »11
shows that reporting is expected to cover monetary policy definitions, approaches, objectives
and instruments. The ECB has to explain its past monetary policy decisions in the light of recent
inflation trends and how they comply with price stability. In addition, the ECB has to explain its
inflation forecasts, its comments on other institutions’ forecasts and comparisons of these with
the price stability target set, as well as the forecasts for real GDP growth upon which its broad
assessment is based.
The European Parliament also calls on the ECB to include a description of how the ECB intends
to support the general economic policies in the Community with their monetary policy, as well
as their appraisal of the extent to which monetary policy has in fact supported these general
economic policies. In the interest of transparency and credibility the ECB should make it clear
how monetary policy is intended, over and above the objective of price stability, to contribute to
a balanced and appropriate policy mix in order to promote growth and employment.
All in all, the first monthly reports provide the key data and broad reasoning behind monetary
policy decisions. They have proven, however, not to be sufficiently detailed, as they concentrate
almost exclusively on past developments. It is surprising that the ECB does not publish its own
projections or predictions for price developments and some key variables, just as projections on
the basis of the current policy stance would be particularly helpful. The ECB claims that the
forecasts might have an adverse effect on financial markets and wage and price setting, and that
the credibility of the ESCB could be damaged in the medium-term if the conditional nature of
the forecasts is not well understood. In addition, the ECB argues that their estimates and models
are still in a preliminary phase and that they have not tested them enough to be sure of their
quality. These justifications are not convincing. Producing an inflation forecast is certainly
difficult, especially at the start of EMU, in view of the wide uncertainties concerning the
reliability of past relationships between money and prices. But whatever these difficulties, the
ECB has to make its own forecasts on the basis of which it takes the relevant policy decisions.
Therefore, the European Parliament calls on the ECB to publish forecasts on a six-monthly basis
which set out the prospects and the risks attached to those prospects, for domestic demand and
its principal components; net exports, nominal and gross domestic product, consumer price
inflation, unemployment and the current account balance, together with relevant data and
research on which such forecasts are based, in order to permit a reliable assessment of monetary
decisions, avoid market misinformation, ensure market transparency and hence counter
speculation. In this context, the ECB should explain the weight and importance of indicators
other than its two pillars of monetary reference values and inflation forecasts. Not revealing to12
the public the background analysis for its policy decisions could give rise to the suspicion that
the ECB wants to hide information from the public. This appears unjustified from any relevant
point of view. Therefore, the European Parliament welcomes the announcement of the ECB
President made on October 26, 1999 during the plenary session that the ECB decided to go
farther in terms of transparency and publish inflation forecasts
17 and its econometric models.
3.  Publication of the minutes
The Statute of the ESCB and the ECB states in Article 10.4 that the proceedings of the meetings
of the Governing Council “shall be confidential. The Governing Council may decide to make
the outcome of its deliberations public”. The European Parliament calls for a summary of the
minutes of the ECB Council meetings to be published. These should  include the decisions
taken, the reasoning behind them and, most importantly, the arguments for and against these
decisions. In addition, the summaries should explain how the decisions are linked to and affect
other policies to prepare a sound basis for financial market decisions. The minutes should be
published  at the latest by the day after the ECB’s next meeting. The Federal Reserve believes
that the volatility of financial markets can be restrained by a transparent decision-making
process. Studies are being undertaken in order to find out how the Federal Reserve can improve
its transparency. The ECB has refused to publish the minutes arguing that publishing minutes
would create financial market disturbances. It can be argued, however, that publishing minutes
might be useful to prevent central bank presidents from putting national interests over EMU
interests. The Bank of England goes farther in terms of transparency and accountability than the
ECB by publishing their minutes and including details of voting behaviour. The US Federal
Reserve has adopted a practice which reconciles the need for the bank to be independent with
the need for openness of decision-making. The fact that minutes recording decisions are
published has never once caused any turbulence on the markets or concern among investors.
Nor has the independence of the Federal Reserve been called into question by the markets
because of the minutes being published.
                                               
17 Verbatim report of proceedings, October 26, 1999 : « Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank : (…)
There will come a time when we will publish forecasts, either bi-annually or tri-annually. »13
4.  Publication of the voting records
The question of whether or not the ECB should publish their voting records is still a matter of
discussion in the European Parliament. The European Parliament decided not to require this
during this first phase of the ECB’s existence. It is true that the publication of votes could ensure
that each Council member becomes particularly attentive to the need to be able to justify his or
her own position in terms of their mandate to scrutinise developments in the euro area as a
whole rather than developments in their own member state. Given that they will want to
maximise respect for their own professional judgement and integrity, publication could even be
the best means to ensure both high quality independent judgements and independence for the
ECB as a whole. This is also the view which has now been taken by other leading central banks,
including the US Federal Reserve Board and most recently by the Bank of Japan. Consequently,
the pressure on the ECB to publish voting records after ECB Council meetings is growing.
The European Parliament, however, has so far taken the view that the ECB is a new institution
and has to increase the European dimension of the decision-making process while the other
economic actors are on the national level of the member states. To formulate and implement a
uniform monetary policy for the entire Euro-zone, the Europeanization process should not be
disturbed by speculation about voting. In particular, it is feared that the publication of the names
of council members in votes would encourage pressure on individual members by political
leaders and national public opinion. At the beginning, a new institution needs some time for
preparation. But the argument put forward by members of the Federal Reserve is also valid that
publication of voting records makes them feel more independent. After all, what is essential in
the Parliament’s view is that the Council does not agree tacitly, but that individual views are
made known.
5.  Reporting to the European Parliament – the monetary dialogue
In addition to the presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report, quarterly meetings on recent
monetary and economic developments with the President and/or other members of the Executive
Board take place. In this way, greater certainty concerning monetary policy can be attained than
would be possible purely by publishing reports, as the substance of the reports would be
determined solely by the ECB. The monetary dialogue between the European Parliament and the
ECB has been established on a regular basis in order to increase the transparency and credibility
of the ECB as well as to avoid any misunderstandings which might have an adverse effect on
the markets, and invite speculation. There are four issues to be discussed: firstly, monetary14
policy concepts and strategies; secondly, the ECB’s contribution to growth and employment;
thirdly, the international dimension of the euro and fourthly, transparency and other issues. In
addition, more practical questions with an impact for citizens and economic actors are dealt
with, such as the changeover scenario, the introduction of banknotes, European payment
systems and banking fees for the exchange of currencies. Reporting takes place at regular
meetings lasting 2 – 3 hours which start with a short introductory statement by the President
amd continue with comments and questions from the Members of Parliament and answers by
the President.
Past experience of the dialogues between the European Parliament, the Presidents of the EMI
and national central banks and the Subcommittee on Monetary Affairs has shown that
democratic accountability is perfectly feasible in the form of reporting and dialogue. In addition,
the European Parliament invites the ECB President  to take part in the general debate on
monetary and economic developments over the previous and the current year, on the basis of the
Annual Report of the ECB and the European Commission’s Annual Economic Report as well as
the broad economic guidelines which are proposed by the Commission and later on decided by
the Council of Ministers. The dialogue between the European Parliament and the ECB
concentrates on price stability, and the monetary targets and instruments used in pursuing price
stability and it may at any time be initiated at the request of the President of the ECB or the
European Parliament. An issue of special importance is the role of the ECB in contributing to a
balanced and appropriate policy mix, especially with a view to the secondary objective of the
ECB, always without impairing the objective of price stability.
6.  First conclusions on the monetary dialogue
In the regular meetings of the quarterly monetary dialogue, increasingly well-prepared Members
of the European Parliament question the President of the ECB on the monetary decisions of the
ECB and his view on the economic situation, thereby holding him to account. The minutes of
these meetings, as well as a verbatim transcript, can be found on the web site of the European
Parliament
18. Experience has shown that talking to the media, as the ECB does immediately
after council meetings, is insufficient as the media are more interested in the news as such than
in the consistency of decisions with a more medium-term orientation of monetary policy. In
contrast to that, the Members of the European Parliament, who represent the citizens of the
European Union, can insist on specific issues by means of detailed questions. Examples of
                                               
18 http://www.europarl.eu.int15
topics of concern that were raised in the monetary dialogue on January 19 and April 19, 1999
with Mr Duisenberg and on September 27, 1999 with Mr Noyer were the two-pillar-strategy of
the ECB, inflation forecasts and monetary definitions. Earlier this year, the European Parliament
raised the question of the existence of deflationary pressures rather than inflationary risks.
Members also attached particular importance to the external value of the euro and the upper
bounder of the inflation rate. The ECB conceded that it was “entirely possible” to exceed the
lower or the upper limit of 2% of inflation on a short-term basis, claiming that this would not be
a matter of concern for the ECB. The role of the ECB in a broader macro-economic
environment and its interpretation of Article 105 of the Treaty was another crucial issue.
Although the ECB had always claimed that the only contribution it could make to foster
economic growth and job creation would be to maintain price stability, they now seem to feel
more responsible about it. The ECB pointed out that at the time of the reduction in interest rates,
there were much greater risks for a decrease in inflation and at the same time for a downturn. As
the President of the ECB emphasised during the monetary dialogue on April 19, 1999: “But the
major risk is that we see the down-turn in expectations regarding real economic developments.
(…) the weighing of all these risks with regard to both pillars of our monetary strategy means
that it is possible for us to pay due attention to the secondary objective of monetary policy of the
ECB, namely to support without risk to price stability, the general economic policies in the
Community.”
19 On September 27, 1999, the Vice-President of the ECB Christian Noyer pointed
out that: “Certainly the ECB does want to give an economic upturn a chance in the coming
period. (…) We have fully taken on board the need to provide the best possible economic
environment.”
20 It was very surprising to hear, on October 26, 1999 during the presentation of
the ECB’s annual report, that “By maintaining price stability, it is our firm belief monetary
policy makes the best contribution it can to achieving a high level of output and employment in
the medium-term. (…)”. In addition, he made allusion to a possible rise in interest rates.
21
Judging from the first meetings of the monetary dialogue, the ECB has made use of the
opportunity to explain its conduct of monetary policy and, by making the background to its
monetary policy decision transparent, has increased public confidence in and the credibility of
European monetary policy through its monetary dialogue with the European Parliament.
                                               
19 Minutes of the monetary dialogue on April 19, 1999
20 Minutes of the monetary dialogue on September 27, 199916
VI. Perspectives
The first year of the euro has been very successful indeed. Monetary policy, now that it has
become the responsibility of the European Central Bank, has gained in profile. With the start of
EMU, transparency has increased. The ECB has proved to be more than a copy of the
Bundesbank as a new European type of central banking has evolved. Important international and
European meetings in which the ECB participates, have demonstrated this new role of European
monetary policy very clearly. But a new type has also developed as far as the communication of
monetary decisions is concerned. The European Parliament, as the representative of the
European citizens, is seen to be the appropriate interlocutor of the ECB. However, much
remains to be done to implement real accountability. Simply providing the European Parliament
with information is not sufficient – the information given has to be clear and complete.
Interest rate movements have to be explained thoroughly and underlying data and forecasts have
to be provided, but unfortunately, this did not happen either for the cut in interest rates in April
1999 or for the rise in November 1999. The explanations given were far from convincing,
especially that for the rise in interest rates. Only clear information avoids misleading the
markets and giving rise to speculation. Especially with a view to Article 105, the ESCB has to
make clearer how monetary policy is intended to contribute to a balanced and appropriate policy
mix in order to promote sustainable growth and employment, without prejudice to the objective
of price stability. The explanation given for the reduction of interest rates by 50 basis points was
understood as a clear commitment of the ECB to recognise its obligation to support general
economic policies. Its second monetary decision, however, where interest rates were increased
by 50 basis points, apparently failed to take into account this secondary target. It remains
absolutely unclear why, given the different economic developments in the euro-11 zone, a
decision was apparently taken November 1999 on the basis of the inflationary pressures in three
Member States, thus leading to an asymmetric monetary policy. It would have been quite
possible to decide for a symmetric approach in spring 2000. Transparency means that all
relevant information underlying the decision-making process has to be disclosed. Obviously, the
ECB is still a young institution which lacks staff and experience. Forecasts and models still have
to be developed, examined and proved before being made public. But the ECB has to increase
transparency in order to gain credibility.
                                                                                                                                                     
21 Verbatim report of proceedings, October 26, 1999 :  « Raising interest rates in a certain situation might be more
akin or related to lifting your foot from the peddle as opposed to braking the momentum of the economy and in that
way going slower. We all want to go forward.”17
The transparency of the ECB will help the economic actors better to understand monetary
policies. Openness will make European monetary union more successful. The European Union
needs an appropriate and balanced policy mix where all components – the single monetary
policy, 15 national fiscal policies and decentralised wage policies – contribute to economic
growth and employment. Thus, the ECB is an important partner in the macro-economic dialogue
which was launched at the Cologne summit on June 3 and 4, 1999 and organised for the first
time on November 8, 1999 in Brussels. The macro-economic dialogue creates a platform from
which the three different policy actors enter into a direct exchange of views. Its impact,
however, is still very limited because binding commitments are not foreseen. But the macro-
economic dialogue might help the independent European Central Bank to make a contribution to
policy co-ordination and thus to growth and employment. Transparency is the first step for
understanding the field and type of action of this particular participant.2008
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